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Abstract
The majority of machine learning methodologies operate with the assumption
that their environment is benign. However, this assumption does not always
hold, as it is often advantageous to adversaries to maliciously modify the train-
ing (poisoning attacks) or test data (evasion attacks). Such attacks can be catas-
trophic given the growth and the penetration of machine learning applications
in society. Therefore, there is a need to secure machine learning enabling the
safe adoption of it in adversarial cases, such as spam filtering, malware detec-
tion, and biometric recognition. This paper presents a taxonomy and survey
of attacks against systems that use machine learning. It organizes the body of
knowledge in adversarial machine learning so as to identify the aspects where
researchers from different fields can contribute to. The taxonomy identifies at-
tacks which share key characteristics and as such can potentially be addressed
by the same defense approaches. Thus, the proposed taxonomy makes it easier
to understand the existing attack landscape towards developing defence mecha-
nisms, which are not investigated in this survey. The taxonomy is also leveraged
to identify open problems that can lead to new research areas within the field
of adversarial machine learning.
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1. Introduction
In recent years, tremendous progress has been made in Machine Learning
(ML) and its use has become ubiquitous in many emerging applications where
data can be collected and processed locally, at edge or the cloud. This data can
be used for training of machine learning models, which in turn can be deployed
for example to perform predictions or support decision making in healthcare [1],
intrusion detection [2], fraud detection [3], autonomous vehicles [4] and many
other applications [5–7].
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This rapidly expanding adoption of ML technologies, however, has rendered
them attractive targets to adversaries who want to manipulate such mechanisms
for malevolent purposes [8]. All ML systems are trained using datasets that are
assumed to be representative and trustworthy for the subject matter in question
thus enabling the construction of a valid system perception of the phenomenon of
interest. However, malicious actors can impact the decision-making algorithms
of such approaches by either targeting the training data or forcing the model to
their desired output, e.g., misclassification of abnormal events. These types of at-
tacks, known as poisoning and evasion attacks [9] respectively, allow adversaries
to significantly decrease overall performance, cause targeted misclassification or
bad behaviour, and insert backdoors and neural Trojans [8, 10].
Adversarial Machine Learning (AML) sits at the intersection of machine
learning and cyber security, and it is often defined as the study of effective
machine learning techniques against an adversarial opponent [10]. For exam-
ple, Huang et al. [11] propose a new method that learns robust classifiers from
supervised data by generating adversarial examples as an intermediate step facil-
itating the attack detection. Representative examples of applications that AML
can be applied to include intrusion detection, spam filtering, visual recognition
and biometrics authentication.
What is missing is an in-depth investigation of all the possible AML attack
vectors (i.e., their configuration, execution, strategy, impact, etc.) that can lead
to a detailed taxonomy of attacks and threats against the various phases of the
ML pipeline. This can enable the design and implementation of more appro-
priate mitigation countermeasures. Currently, only a small number of related
taxonomies and surveys have been published. Adversarial behaviour has also
been investigated as part of online learning Markov Decision Processes (MDPs)
when both the transition distributions and loss functions are chosen by an ad-
versary [12, 13].
1.1. Motivation & Contributions
Motivated by these issues, the aim of this investigation is to provide a com-
plete analysis and taxonomy of the types of malicious attacks against the entire
ML pipeline. In this context, we address the natural limitations of the early tax-
onomies by providing a new, comprehensive categorization, covering both old
(pre-2011), newer (post-2011) and potential areas of research that may arise in
the future in a complete landscape of adversarial machine learning. We use this
taxonomy as the basis for surveying and classifying the different available ap-
proaches, especially emphasizing on the ones presented over the last two years,
and identifying which areas could benefit considerably from further research. In
summary, this paper’s contributions can be summarized as follows:
(i) a comprehensive taxonomy of the characteristics of AML approaches (Section
2),
(ii) a systematic review of the landscape of existing AML approaches towards
their categorization and classification, following the proposed taxonomy, for
the aforementioned application domains (Section 3) and,
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(iii) identification of open issues and specific areas where further research can
have considerable impact (Section 4).
Through this investigation, our main goal is to shed light on this emerging
attack paradigm so that it can be used as a baseline for the design of more
robust countermeasures; so that machine learning can offer enhanced security
and privacy capabilities that can further accelerate data-driven insights and
knowledge acquisition.
1.2. Related Work
From a cyber security perspective, there are multiple avenues for adversely
affecting a system that is based on machine learning for example by targeting
its data collection or transmission, and manipulating its models developed or
their input (Figure 1). Remarkably, for such a research area that has extensive
societal impact, only a small number of related taxonomies and surveys have
been published. In 2011, Huang et al. [10] published an early taxonomy of ad-
versarial machine learning including categories for influence, security violation
and specificity. This has served as an excellent basis for attack categorization,
but over the years it has naturally become less able to cover newer approaches.
Adversarial attacks against machine learning have become a reality in a vari-
ety of applications. Intrusion detection is a very important defence mechanism,
which can be bypassed by adversaries who achieve to increase false negatives
or both false positives and false negatives. In addition, the importance of spam
filtering, given the growth of attacks against email classification, is prominent
making it another key use case for researchers. Furthermore, the growth of deep
neural networks and the proliferation of automated vehicles has made visual
recognition an attractive field for adversaries to attack machine learning (e.g.,
[14–20]).
Recently Shumailov et al. [21] published a work where they use taboo be-
haviours both subtle and diverse to detect adversarial attacks and make a classi-
fier more robust against them. Most papers surveyed investigate attacks within
this domain and most of them are concerned with perturbed samples that con-
fuse the machine learning systems. Nevertheless, adversarial attacks have been
noticed in a variety of other applications (or combination of them) such as rec-
ommendation systems, autoregressive forecasting models, biometric recognition
systems, credit card fraud detection systems. There are also attacks aiming at
different applications of machine learning, or attacks which were initially created
for one application and might be equally effective in a variety of others.
This is not the first survey in the field of adversarial machine learning but
there are distinguished differences between the existing literature and our paper.
The proposed taxonomy, not only offers a straightforward way to classify papers
that study a wide range of attacks against machine learning, but it is also a
guideline of what has been proposed so far in the literature. Yet, it offers a new
perspective of breaking down the various types of features leveraged to classify
different attacks by introducing a number of phases that each of the attack
features are uniquely associated with.
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Figure 1: Different avenues for attacking a machine learning based system
The survey by Zhou et al. [22] has focused specifically on the relatively
small number of approaches that model adversarial machine learning behaviour
in a game-theoretic manner, where the players are the learning system and an
adversary who is attacking it. Other surveys have emphasized on the particular
characteristics of the application that is affected. For example, Akhtar et al. [23]
have addressed adversarial attacks against deep learning in computer vision,
investigating attacks that are specific to autoencoders and generative models,
recurrent neural networks, deep reinforcement learning, semantic segmentation
and object detection, and face attributes. In addition, Zhang et al.[24] focused
on Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) and artificial intelligence, surveying methods
of generating adversarial along with countermeasures. Duddu [25] assume that
the adversary aims to reveal sensitive information handled by machine learning
as well as information about the system architecture. They described a cyber-
warfare testbed to test the effectiveness of various attack-defence strategies. Sun
et al. [26] tried to bridge the gap between theory and practice, formalized the
threat model for practical attack schemes with adversarial examples against real
systems. Most recently, Biggio et al. [27] have produced a very useful technical
review of the evolution of active research in adversarial machine learning over
the past ten years, while Yuan et al. [28] focused on the adversarial attacks and
defences in models built with deep neural networks, proposing a taxonomy on
attack approaches. The difference of our work is that we propose a taxonomy
to classify the different papers that propose attacks against machine learning
in order to unify the field. Our work can serve as a stepping stone towards the
creation of a holistic defending framework and also motivate the creation of a
taxonomy of defences against attacks on machine learning.
1.3. Attack models
The attack models we consider in this paper implement the following types
of attacks: poisoning and evasion. The high level goal of these models is to max-
imize the generalization error of the classification and possibly mislead the de-
cision making system towards desired malicious measurement values. As stated
in [29], a system that uses machine learning aims to find a hypothesis function
f that maps observable events, into different classes.
Let us consider a system that monitors network behaviour and performs
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anomaly-based intrusion detection. An instance of this behaviour is an event
that is classified using utility function f either as Normal or Malicious. Let us
assume an input space X = {xi} and an output space Y = {yi}, where xi is
an event and yi is the output of this event determined by f , i.e. f(xi) = yi.
We assume that the system has been trained using N samples that form the
training set S and it has derived the system perception, denoted by ŷ. After
the end of the training phase, the system receives new events from the actual
environment and classifies them. We define this as the run-time phase of the
system. For every new event x̂i, f gives a new output f(x̂i) = ŷi. We have the
following cases:
• If x̂i is malicious and the system does not recognize it as such (false negative)
there is a loss l caused to the system.
• If x̂i is malicious and the system recognizes it as such (true positive) or it is
not malicious then there is no loss to the system.
• If x̂i is not malicious and the system recognizes it as such (false positive) then
there is a loss λ.
The aim of the attacker is to maximize the impact the attack has to the
system by maximizing |f(x̂i)−yi|. Thus, a challenge of the system that defends
is to find a utility function that minimizes the losses, measured as the distance
of f(x̂i) to the real output yi. This function can be linear or nonlinear and be
more complex in formulation as in [30].
Evasion attacks: The adversary can undertake an evasion attack against
classification during the testing phase thus producing a wrong system percep-
tion. In this case, the goal of the adversary is to achieve misclassification of
some data towards, for example, remaining stealthy or mimicking some desir-
able behaviour. With regards to network anomaly-based detection, an intrusion
detection system (IDS) can be evaded by encoding the attack payload in such
a way that the destination of the data is able to decode it but the IDS is not
leading to a possible misclassification. Thus, the attacker can compromise the
targeted system being spotted out by the IDS. An additional goal of the attacker
could be to cause concept drift to the system leading to continuous system re-
training, thus, significantly degrading its performance [31].
Poisoning attacks: The adversary can poison the training dataset. To
achieve this, the adversary derives and injects a point to decrease the clas-
sification accuracy [32]. This attack has the ability to completely distort the
classification function during its training thus allowing the attacker to define
the classification of the system in any way she wishes. The magnitude of the
classification error depends on the data the attacker has chosen to poison the
training. With regards to the aforesaid example, the adversary may be able
to create dataset of anomalous network-layer protocol behaviour and train an
anomaly-based intrusion detection system with a labelled attack dataset as the
groundtruth. As a result, the detector will not be able to recognize cyber attacks
against this network-layer protocol threatening the security of the underlying
system. This attack could be tailored to also have a significant impact to the
quality of a signature-based intrusion detection system, which is responsible, for
example, for detecting malware infecting a system or an infrastructure.
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For example, a particularly insidious attack in this category is the backdoor
or Trojan attack, where the adversary carefully poisons the model by inserting
a backdoor key to ensure it will perform well on standard training data and
validation samples, but misbehaves only when a backdoor key is present [33].
Thus an attacker can selectively make a model misbehave by introducing back-
door keys once the model is deployed. For instance, consider the case of assistive
driving in autonomous vehicles: a backdoor could cause the model to misclas-
sify a stop sign as speed limit whenever a specific mark has been placed on the
stop sign. However, the model would perform as expected on stop signs without
this mark, making the backdoor difficult to detect since users do not know the
backdoor key a priori.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly describes the
taxonomy of attacks against machine learning; Section 3 provides a systematic
review of the adversarial machine learning approaches regarding each application
area; Section 4 discusses the distribution of papers per taxonomy phase, open
problems in adversarial machine learning and draws the conclusions giving some
pointers for future work.
2. Proposed taxonomy
While the implementation details of attacks against machine learning may
vary considerably, their individual steps can be broadly classified into two dis-
tinct phases: (i) Preparation and (ii) Manifestation, as illustrated in Figure 2






























Figure 2: A taxonomy of adversarial attacks on machine learning.
of each taxonomy phase.
2.1. Preparation
In this phase, the attackers identify their resources and gather the intelligence
required to prepare an attack plan. Here, what determines the characteristics
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of an adversarial machine learning approach is the knowledge required by the
attacker, as well as the type of machine learning technique targeted and whether
the attacker is strategic, i.e. they use game-theoretic techniques. As such we
discuss the following features:
• Attacker Knowledge: Here, we take the simplified view whereby the at-
tacker may know (K1) the Ground truth, (K2) the learning algorithm, or
both, leading to the following attacker knowledge categories:
– Blackbox attacks: ¬K1 ∧ ¬K2.
– Graybox attacks: K1 ∨K2.
– Whitebox attacks: K1 ∧K2.
According to [27], the attacker knowledge may refer to (i) the training data,
(ii) the feature set, (iii) the machine learning algorithm along with the ob-
jective function minimized during training and (iv) any trained parameters if
applicable.
• Algorithm: A large variety of machine learning techniques has been targeted
in the literature. Indicatively, it is DNNs and Convolutional Neural Networks
(CNNs) that are commonly addressed in the image recognition domain, while
in spam email detection, more common are Naive Bayes, Support Vector
Machines (SVM) and Logistic Regression (LR). Other techniques, such as
K-Means, K-Nearest Neighbour (KNN), Linear Regression, Community Dis-
covery and Singular Value Decomposition, are typically seen in the malware
detection, biometric recognition and network failure and security breach de-
tection domains. For the purposes of this taxonomy, we have classified the
techniques based on the machine learning algorithm used in: i) clustering, ii)
classification, or iii) hybrid fashion.
• Game theory: Adversarial machine learning is commonly equipped with
a strategic element, whereby, in game theory terminology, the defender is
the machine learning classifier and the attacker is a data generator aiming
to contaminate, for example, the training dataset. Both choose their actions
strategically in what can be seen as a non-cooperative game [34]. The adver-
sary aims at confusing the classification or clustering with costs related to,
e.g. the transformation process or probability of being detected. On the other
hand, the defender incurs, for instance, a cost for misclassifying samples. The
importance of game theory for the defender lies within the field of making the
classifiers more aware of adversarial actions and more resistant to them.
2.2. Manifestation
This is the phase where the adversary launches the attack against the ma-
chine learning system. Largely dependent on the intelligence gathered in the
preparation phase, the attack manifestation can be characterized based on the
following characteristics:
• Attack Specificity: This refers to range of data points that are targeted by
the attacker [29, 35]. It is also mentioned as error specificity in the recent
survey of Barreno et al. [27].
– Targeted: The focus of the attack is on a particular sample (e.g., specific
spam email misclassified as legitimate) or a small set of samples.
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– Indiscriminate: The adversary attacks a very general class of samples,
such as “any false negative” (e.g., maximizing the percentage of spam emails
misclassified as legitimate).
• Attack Type: This refers to how the machine learning system is affected by
an attack [29, 35].
– Poisoning: Poisoning attacks alter the training process through influence
over the training data.
– Evasion: Evasion attacks exploit misclassifications but do not affect train-
ing (e.g. the learner or offline analysis, to discover information).
• Attack Mode: The original assumption of adversarial machine learning,
which is still taken in most related literature, is that attackers work on their
own (non-colluding case). The alternative is that different colluding attackers
can collaborate, not only to cover their tracks but also to increase efficiency.
2.3. Attack Evaluation
The output of an attack’s manifestation is primarily characterized by the
nature of its impact on the accuracy of a machine learning approach. Each
paper evaluates this impact by taking different approaches and metrics used to
quantify and express it.
• Evaluation Approach: A goal of this work is to help researchers and devel-
opers improve the resilience of their mechanisms against adversarial machine
learning by adopting approaches that have been thoroughly evaluated. We
classify the related literature based on whether the proposed approaches have
been evaluated analytically, in simulation, or experimentally.
• Performance impact: The primary aim of adversarial machine learning
is to reduce the performance of a classification or clustering process that is
based on machine learning. For classification problems, this can be interpreted
as increase in false positives, in false negatives, or in both. For clustering
problems, the aim is generally to reduce accuracy.
– False positives: In classification problems, such as spam detection, where
there are two states (spam or normal), the aim of an attacker may be to
make the targeted system falsely label many normal emails as spam emails.
This would lead to the user missing emails.
– False negatives: Using the same example, if the attacker aims to increase
the false negatives, then many spam emails would go through the user’s
filters.
– Both false positives and false negatives: Here, the attacker aims to
reduce the overall confidence of the user in their spam filtering system by
letting spam emails go through and by filtering out normal emails.
– Clustering accuracy reduction: Compared to classification, the accu-
racy of clustering is less straight-forward to evaluate. Here, we include a
general reduction of accuracy as the overall aim of the attacker of a clus-
tering algorithm.
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3. Adversarial attacks on machine learning
In this section we elaborate on the different adversarial attacks against ap-
plications that deploy machine learning. We have grouped the various articles
based on the application domain so that it becomes clear how adversarial ma-
chine learning has evolved in each of these fields.
Fig. 3 illustrates the percentage of papers investigating adversarial machine
learning for the various application domains. With the name “Other” we refer
to articles that do not fall in any of the popular, within the field of adversarial
machine learning, application domains (i.e., Intrusion Detection, Spam Filtering,
Visual Recognition) while “Multipurpose” refers to papers that have investigated
more than one application domain in order to assess their contributions.
Statistics show that the “Multipurpose” category covers the highest percent-
age of papers demonstrating the tendency of most authors to evaluate their work
using different applications domains and understand the effect of the domain
to the performance evaluation results. We observe that visual recognition is the
second most investigated domain, which largely is due to the existence and the
ease of use of well-known datasets such as the MNIST database of handwritten










Figure 3: Percent of papers per application domain.
In the rest of this section, we discuss and present the surveyed papers per
application domain for which we include three tables to provide a summary of
the main features of the papers reviewed per attack phase (Preparation and
Manifestation).
3.1. Intrusion Detection
3.1.1. Naive Learning Algorithm
Barreno et al. were the first who gave relevant properties, such as attack
influence and specificity, for analyzing attacks on machine learning systems. In
[29], they provided an example from the intrusion detection systems domain,
in which an adversary can launch a whitebox poisoning attack by maliciously
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miss-training a learning IDS system, thus making the classifier (classification)
unable to determine if a specific sample (targeted) is malicious or not (incurring
both false positives and false negatives).
3.1.2. Support Vector Machine (SVM)
Biggio et al. [38] created a simple algorithm for evasion of classifiers with
differentiable discriminant functions. They investigated the attack effectiveness
on a realistic application related to the detection of PDF malware, and empir-
ically showed that very popular classification algorithms (in particular, SVMs
and neural networks) can still be evaded (evasion attack) by launching gray-
box to whitebox attacks against the classifier with high probability even if the
adversary can only learn a copy of the classifier (classification) from a small
surrogate data set. The attacker’s goal would be to manipulate a single sample
to be misclassified leading to increasing rate of false negatives.
3.1.3. Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator - Elastic Net
Xiao et al. [39] also performed experiments on PDF malware detection and
were one of the first groups that proposed a framework to categorize different
attacks of embedded feature selection algorithms using previously proposed poi-
soning and evasion attack models for the security of classification and clustering
algorithms (classification and clustering). The attacker’s goal, who launches
graybox to whitebox attacks in these settings is to poison (poisoning attack)
the training data, in both targeted and indiscriminate ways, so that a wrong
subset of features is selected. The authors derived a poisoning feature selection
algorithm increasing either both false positives and false negatives or causing
clustering accuracy reduction.
3.1.4. Spectral Clustering - Community Discovery AND node2vec
Chen et al. [40] focus on another problem that may arise in graph based
detection systems used in network detection. They devised two novel graybox
and whitebox attacks launched by adversaries who use targeted noise injection
(poisoning) and small community attacks against graph clustering or embed-
ding techniques with their primary purpose to avoid detection (increase false
negatives). The latter include community discovery, Singular Value Decompo-
sition and node2vec, which are a combination of classification and clustering .
The noise injection is targeted while the small community attacks are indiscrim-
inate as a result of the attacker choosing, in s random manner, graph nodes to
manipulate.
3.1.5. Principal Component Analysis
Rubinstein et al. [41] focused on detecting anomalies in backbone networks
through clustering and considered a new model of Boiling frog attack schemes
using the Principal Component Analysis (PCA-subspace method). In these poi-
soning attack schemes, the attacker performs blackbox to whitebox attacks
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Barreno et al. [29] 7 7 3 7 3 7 7 3
Biggio et al. [38] 7 3 3 7 3 7 7 3
Xiao et al. [39] 7 3 3 3 3 7 7 3
Chen et al. [40] 7 3 7 3 7 7 7 3
Rubinstein et al. [41] 3 3 3 3 7 7 7 3
Wang et al. [42] 7 3 3 3 7 7 7 3
Demetrio et al. [43] 3 7 7 7 3 7 7 3
Table 1: Comparative analysis of Intrusion Detection Systems at Preparation Phase
against the learner, poisoning the training data slowly, but increasingly, over
weeks remaining undetected. The attack focuses on the training phase of the
system and increases both false positives and false negatives rate with its final
goal being to cause Denial of Service. This work assumed two cases: (i) the
attacker performs link poisoning when the traffic volume on the link exceeds a
parameter (targeted) in order to increase traffic variance and (ii) the attacker
injects traffic on any link (indiscriminate).
3.1.6. Support Vector Machine - Bayesian - Decision Trees and Random Forests
Wang et al. [42] performed an empirical study of the efficacy of ML models
(clustering) for detecting malicious crowd-sourcing, also known as crowd-turfing.
They evaluated a powerful class of whitebox poisoning attacks, where the ad-
versary injects: (i) either carefully selected data (targeted) into training data
to greatly reduce the efficacy of the detector, increasing the rate of both false
positives and false negatives; or (ii) random normal accounts to the turfing class
(indiscriminate). Furthermore, the evasion attacks studied by the authors are
targeted since only individual instances (represented by the “workers”) can be
altered.
3.1.7. Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN)
Within the context of deep neural networks as applied to binary malware
detection, Demetrio et al. [43] proposed a blackbox evasion attack against the
classification capabilities of a convolutional neural network named MalConv
[44]. They applied the integrated gradients technique to malware programs.
Their methodology selects the closest byte to the embedded space of binary






































Barreno et al. [29] 3 7 7 3 3 7
Biggio et al. [38] 3 3 7 3 7 3
Xiao et al. [39] 3 3 7 3 3 7
Chen et al. [40] 3 3 7 3 3 7
Rubinstein et al. [41] 3 3 7 3 3 7
Wang et al. [42] 3 3 3 3 3 7
Demetrio et al. [43] 3 7 7 3 7 3
Table 2: Comparative analysis of Intrusion Detection Systems at Manifestation Phase
3.2. Spam Filtering
3.2.1. Linear Classifiers
Focusing on spam detection and the use of Naive Bayes, Lowd and Meek
[45] defined an Adversarial Classifier Reverse Engineering (ACRE) model. In
ACRE, the adversary launches graybox evasion attacks against the classifier
(classification) by sending membership queries to the classifier. By attacking
the system’s testing phase, the goal of the attacker is to determine whether a
specific instance is malicious or not. Additionally, the attack aims at increasing
the rate of false negatives by classifying spam messages as benign. The authors
assume that the attacker optimizes his cost over all instances characterizing the
attack as indiscriminate.
3.2.2. Game Theory
Li and Vorobeychik [46] proposed a similar approach in terms of attack influ-
ence (evasion attack) and used feature reduction in a specific phase to increase
the rate of false negatives. They argued that the graybox attacks launched by
an adversary depends on the restricted budget he has, and so they modeled
a Stackelberg Game with multiple attackers, where the Learner moves first by
choosing a linear classifier, and all attackers simultaneously and independently
respond to the learner’s choice by manipulating the feature vector, where the
training dataset is the pair of (feature vectors, corresponding binary labels).
This is an indiscriminate attack for which the attacker solves an optimization





























































Barreno et al. [29] 7 7 7 7 7 3 7
Biggio et al. [38] 7 7 3 7 3 7 7
Xiao et al. [39] 7 7 3 7 7 7 3
Chen et al. [40] 7 7 3 7 3 7 7
Rubinstein et al. [41] 7 7 3 7 7 3 7
Wang et al. [42] 7 7 3 7 7 3 7
Demetrio et al. [43] 7 7 3 7 3 7 7
Table 3: Comparative analysis of Intrusion Detection Systems’ Attack Evaluation
Bruckner and Scheffer [47] in the context of spam email filtering study Stack-
elberg games in which the learner acts as the leader committing to a predictive
model, while the adversary (data generator) acts as the follower generating the
test data at application time. According to their threat model, in a classifica-
tion the adversary launches graybox attacks by influencing the generation of
the data at application time trying to impose the highest cost on the learner
(evasion) with final goal to make spam email misclassified as benign (increase
false negatives). This is an indiscriminate attack as the attacker transforms the
entire training distribution. The same author and his team [48] worked on email
spam filtering through the use of Support Vector Machines (classification) and
created a model of adversarial learning problems as static games. They proposed
that the adversary performs graybox data poisoning during training and test
time. The described attack can increase both false positives and false negatives
depending on if only spam emails are misclassified or every email is misclassified
regardless its content.
Liu and Chawla [49] created a model of the interaction between an email
spammer and the defender as a two-player infinite Stackelberg game, where
players have two actions: Spam or Status Quo (attacker) and Retrain or Status
Quo (defender). When Spam is chosen, the adversary attacks the classifier by
actively modifying spam emails in order to get through the filter. When Re-
train is chosen, the classifier chooses to retrain its system to lower the error
rate. Status quo is a strategy according to which, the attacker does nothing to
bypass the spam filters while the defender does retrain its system tolerating a
potential increase in spam emails getting through. The attacker is launching
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whitebox poisoning attacks targeting the training process of the classifier with
the aim to increase the false negative rate. They proved that the players’ payoff
functions, regarding a two class classification (classification), are given by the
solution of linear optimization problems (indiscriminate) which are solved by
backward induction. Zhang and Zhu [50] established a game-theoretic frame-
work to capture the conflicting interests between the adversary and a set of
distributed data processing units. According to their threat model an whitebox
attack can impact the training process (targeted) by modifying the training data
(poisoning attack) of the SVM (classification having as purpose to maximize the
error rate (increase both false positives and false negatives) by choosing strate-
gies that maximize the attacker’s payoff over the entire set of data instances
(indiscriminate).
As far as regression (classification) problems in spam detection are con-
cerned, Grosshans et al. [51] study non zero sum games with incomplete infor-
mation about the adversary’s cost function. In the Bayesian game they relax
the full information game into an asymmetric one where the adversary has
full information (whitebox attack) about the learner’s cost function, while the
learner’s information is expressed by a distribution over the parameters of the
adversary’s cost function, due to uncertainty. In their threat model the adver-
sary can exercise some control over the distribution of the data (evasion attack)
at application time having as goal to misclassify his data as benign (increase
false negatives). As the attacker generates an entire training matrix, this is an
indiscriminate attack.
3.2.3. Naive Bayes
Dalvi et al. [30] also conducted experiments in the spam detection domain, fo-
cusing on a Naive Bayes classifier (classification). Their approach differs in that
the adversary deploys an optimal feature-changing strategy against the classifier
in the context of a two-player game. The strategy is to cause the classifier to
classify a number of positive instances as negative (false negatives) by modi-
fying them during training. The type is perceived as whitebox evasion as the
adversary constantly updates the approach according to the countermeasures of
the opponent who improves the classifier. Given that the attack strategy is over
all instances this is characterized as a indiscriminate attack.
Following the same approach regarding Naive Bayes applied on spam detec-
tion, Barreno et al. [35] investigated four hypothetical attack scenarios. From
these, the Spam Foretold and the Rogue Filter attacks are poisoning and the
Shifty Spammer and the Mistaken Identity attacks are evasion. They discussed
both targeted and indiscriminate versions of these attacks. In all cases, the ad-
versary launches graybox and whitebox attacks against the classification mecha-
nism (classification) in order to increase the rate of both false positives and false
negatives. This is formulated in an adversarial machine learning game, in which
the defender chooses a learning algorithm and the attacker chooses a procedure
for selecting distributions from which infected training datasets are generated.
Nelson et al. [52] also studied poisoning attacks through the use of Naive
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Lowd et al.[45] 7 3 7 7 3 7 7 3 Li et al. [46] 7 3 3 7 3 7 3 7
Dalvi et al. [30] 7 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 Barreno et al. [35] 7 3 7 7 3 7 3 7
Nelson et al. [52] 3 3 3 7 3 7 7 3 Bruckner et al. [47] 7 3 7 7 3 7 3 7
Bruckner et al. [48] 7 3 7 7 3 7 3 7 Liu et al. [49] 7 7 3 7 3 7 3 7
Zhang et al. [50] 7 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 Grosshans et al. [51] 7 7 3 7 3 7 3 7
Xiao et al. [54] 7 7 3 7 3 7 7 3 Naveiro et al. [53] 7 3 7 7 3 7 7 3
Table 4: Comparative analysis of Spam Filtering at Preparation Phase
Bayes (classification). In their dictionary attack, the adversary sends attack
emails that contain many words likely to occur in legitimate email correspon-
dence (indiscriminate). In their focused attack, the adversary sends attack
emails to the victim containing specific words likely to occur in the target email
(targeted). The same attack may have different levels of knowledge about the
target email ranging from blackbox to whitebox and aims at rendering the spam
filter unusable (increasing the rate of both false positives and false negatives).
Naveiro et al. [53] followed a different approach by proposing the use of
risk analysis in adversarial classification (classification). Specifically, their alter-
native methodology, is called Adversarial Classification Risk Analysis (ACRA)
where no assumptions of common knowledge are made. The adversaries trie
to make their own spam emails undetectable (increase of false negatives) from
the classifier by adapting to the classifier’s responses (graybox evasion attack)


















































































Lowd et al.[45] 7 3 7 3 7 3 Li et al. [46] 7 3 3 3 7 3
Dalvi et al. [30] 7 3 7 3 7 3 Barreno et al. [35] 3 3 7 3 3 3
Nelson et al. [52] 3 3 7 3 3 7 Bruckner et al. [47] 7 3 7 3 7 3
Bruckner et al. [48] 7 3 7 3 3 7 Liu et al. [49] 7 3 7 3 3 7
Zhang et al. [50] 7 3 7 3 3 7 Grosshans et al. [51] 7 3 7 3 7 3
Xiao et al. [54] 3 7 7 3 3 7 Naveiro et al. [53] 7 3 7 3 7 3
Table 5: Comparative analysis of Spam Filtering at Manifestation Phase























































































































Lowd et al.[45] 3 7 3 7 3 7 7 Li et al. [46] 3 7 3 7 3 7 7
Dalvi et al. [30] 3 7 3 7 3 7 7 Barreno et al. [35] 7 7 3 7 7 3 7
Nelson et al. [52] 7 7 3 7 7 3 7 Bruckner et al. [47] 3 7 3 7 3 7 7
Bruckner et al. [48] 3 7 7 7 7 3 7 Liu et al. [49] 3 7 3 7 3 7 7
Zhang et al. [50] 3 7 3 7 7 3 7 Grosshans et al. [51] 3 7 3 7 3 7 7
Xiao et al. [54] 3 7 3 7 7 3 7 Naveiro et al. [53] 3 7 3 7 3 7 7
Table 6: Comparative analysis of Spam Filtering’s Attack Evaluation
3.2.4. Support Vector Machine (SVM)
Xiao et al. [54] studied a poisoning attack in an SVM (classification) spam
email detection model (targeted). In this paper, the attacker is able to flip a
bounded number of samples (targeted) in the training data (whitebox poison-
ing attack), whose values are picked from an also bounded distribution. The
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goal of the attacker is the maximization of the classification error (both false
positives and false negatives). Due to the computational hardness of solving the
bounded problem optimally, the authors proposed two heuristics to derive effi-
cient approximate solutions (attack strategies). The first heuristic is based on
the generation of different sets of flips and the selection of the one that achieves
the best value. The second heuristic is a greedy BFS algorithm that generates
correlated subsets of label flips and the selection of that set that after a number
of iterations maximizes the empirical risk.
3.3. Visual Recognition
3.3.1. Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
Carlini and Wagner [55] have also investigated neural networks applied to im-
age classification. They have studied three types of threat models based on the
extent of knowledge of the adversary: a perfect-Knowledge Adversary; limited-
Knowledge Adversary; and a zero-Knowledge Adversary. Each leads to a dif-
ferent attack: whitebox attack, graybox attack, and a blackbox attack that the
authors have implemented and can be either evasion or poisoning attack. The
adversary attacks different phases (training or testing), depending on his knowl-
edge, with the goal to increase both false positives and false negatives. The au-
thors focus on targeted adversarial examples exclusively in this paper. Finally,
they have used two datasets; the MNIST dataset [56] and the CIFAR-10 dataset
[57].
3.3.2. Random Forest, Support Vector Machine (SVM), and K-Nearest Neighbor
Hayes and Danezis [58] also worked in Neural Networks and focused on
launching blackbox attacks against a variety of machine learning models like
Random Forest, SVM, and K-Nearest Neighbor (classification) hosted in an
amazon instance by creating adversarial examples and testing their effects on
the classifier (evasion attack). The final goal of the attacks is to increase both
false positives and false negatives. In order to create their adversarial examples
they make use of the MNIST dataset and use them to augment the robustness
of a classifier against adversarial examples, something that they achieve.
3.3.3. Artificial Neural Network (ANN)
Shaham et al. [15] proposed a training framework to increase the stability
and the robustness of artificial neural networks against adversarial examples and
performed experiments in visual recognition to test their assumption. According
to them, an adversary launches whitebox attacks against the classifier (classifi-
cation), by targeting a specific artificial neural network and aims to construct
a perturbation of the original input data (poisoning attack). In this data the
network parameters are updated in way that leads to the misclassification of the
training examples (increase both false positives and false negatives). Adversarial

































































































Biggio et al. [59] 7 7 3 3 7 7 7 3 Szegedy et al.[17] 7 3 7 7 3 7 7 3
Goodfellow et al.[60] 7 7 3 7 3 7 7 3 Goodfellow et al. [61] 7 7 3 7 3 7 3 7
Carlini et al. [55] 3 3 3 7 3 7 7 3 Hayes et al. [58] 3 7 7 7 3 7 7 3
Hayes et al. [62] 7 7 3 7 3 7 7 3 Nguyen et al. [16] 3 3 3 7 3 7 7 3
Papernot et al. [63] 3 7 7 7 3 7 7 3 Papernot et al. [64] 3 7 7 7 3 7 7 3
Kurakin et al. [65] 3 3 3 3 3 7 7 3 Shaham et al. [15] 7 7 3 7 3 7 7 3
Evtimov et al. [66] 7 7 3 7 3 7 7 3 Radford et al. [67] 7 3 3 3 3 7 7 3
Schottle et al. [68] 7 3 7 7 3 7 7 3 Chivikula et al. [69] 3 7 7 7 3 7 3 7
Madry et al. [70] 3 3 3 7 3 7 7 3 Springenberg et al. [71] 7 3 7 7 3 3 7 3
Athalye et al. [72] 7 7 3 7 3 7 7 3 Dong et al. [73] 3 7 7 7 3 7 7 3
Jeong et al. [74] 3 7 7 7 3 7 7 3
Table 7: Comparative analysis of Visual Recognition at Preparation Phase
3.3.4. Convolutional neural networks (CNN)
Radford et al. [67] introduced a new class of architectures of convolutional
networks (CNNs) that they call deep convolutional generative adversarial net-
works (DCGANs). They used trained discriminators for image classification
tasks. They showed that DCGANs have competitive performance with unsu-
pervised algorithms, proving that a methodology which was commonly used in
classification can be also effective even in an clustering setting. In that paper,
the adversaries vary in terms of knowledge (graybox-whitebox attacks) and they
can launch a wide variety of attacks in terms of attack influence (evasion and
poisoning attacks) and machine learning phase being attacked with the aim to ei-
ther increase both false positives and false negatives or cause clustering accuracy
reduction. Attacks take place across multiple samples leading to indiscriminate
nature.
Schottle et al. [68] used methods from multimedia forensics to bring robust-
ness to CNNs against adversarial examples. In this work, the attacker launches
graybox attacks against the classifier (classification) by using Projected Gradi-
ent Descent to create adversarial examples and test (evasion attack) how they
are classified to achieve maximization of the misclassification of benign sam-
ples as malicious (increase false positives) leading to a indiscriminate attack.
In order to defend against that group of attackers, the authors combine foren-


















































































Biggio et al. [59] 3 3 7 3 3 3 Szegedy et al.[17] 7 3 7 3 3 7
Goodfellow et al.[60] 7 3 7 3 3 7 Goodfellow et al. [61] 7 3 7 3 7 3
Carlini et al. [55] 3 7 7 3 3 3 Hayes et al. [58] 3 3 7 3 7 3
Hayes et al. [62] 3 3 7 3 3 7 Nguyen et al. [16] 7 3 7 3 7 3
Papernot et al. [63] 7 3 3 7 7 3 Papernot et al. [64] 7 3 3 7 7 3
Kurakin et al. [65] 7 3 7 3 3 3 Shaham et al. [15] 7 3 7 3 3 7
Evtimov et al. [66] 3 3 7 3 7 3 Radford et al. [67] 7 3 3 7 3 3
Schottle et al. [68] 7 3 7 3 7 3 Chivikula et al. [69] 3 7 7 3 3 7
Madry et al. [70] 7 3 7 3 3 3 Springenberg et al. [71] 7 3 7 3 3 7
Athalye et al. [72] 3 3 7 3 3 7 Dong et al. [73] 3 3 7 3 7 3
Jeong et al. [74] 7 3 7 3 3 7
Table 8: Comparative analysis of Visual Recognition at Manifestation Phase
experimenting with the MNIST database, eventually getting good results.
Chivukula et al. [69], using the MNIST handwritten images database pro-
pose a genetic algorithm for deep learning on Convolutional Neural Networks
(classification) that is formulated as a two player zero sum sequential Stack-
elberg game. In every iteration of the game, the adversary, who has no prior
knowledge about the networks structure (blackbox attacks), targets the learner
with data produced using genetic operators with the goal to alter many pos-
itive labels to negative (increase false negatives). The learner adapts to these
adversarial data by retraining (poisoning attack) the weights of the CNN lay-
ers. Upon convergence of the game, an adversarial manipulation parameter is
returned by the algorithm which is then imported into the original data to
produce an adversarial sample for the retraining (targeted).
3.3.5. Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN)
Springenberg [71] studied the problem of an adversarial generative model
that regularizes a discriminatively trained classifier (clustering and hybrid). He
proposed an algorithm which is the result of a natural generalization of the
generative adversarial networks (GAN) framework as an extension of the regu-
larized information maximization (RIM) framework (indiscriminate) to robust
classification against an optimal adversary. According to his point of view, an ad-
versary is able to launch targeted graybox poisoning attacks against the classifier
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in order to avoid detection (increase false negatives rate). Generative adversar-
ial networks are commonly described as a two-player game [61]. In [71], in each
step the generator (attacker) produces an example from random noise that has
the potential to confuse the discriminator (defender). The latter then receives
some real data along with samples produced by the attacker, and attempts to























































































































Biggio et al. [59] 7 7 3 7 7 7 3 Szegedy et al.[17] 7 7 3 7 7 3 7
Goodfellow et al.[60] 7 7 3 7 7 3 7 Goodfellow et al. [61] 3 7 3 7 3 7 7
Carlini et al. [55] 7 7 3 7 7 3 7 Hayes et al. [58] 7 7 3 7 7 3 7
Hayes et al. [62] 7 7 3 7 3 7 7 Nguyen et al. [16] 7 7 3 7 3 7 7
Papernot et al. [63] 7 7 3 7 3 7 7 Papernot et al. [64] 7 7 3 7 3 7 7
Kurakin et al. [65] 7 7 3 7 7 3 7 Shaham et al. [15] 3 7 3 7 7 3 7
Evtimov et al. [66] 7 7 3 7 7 3 7 Radford et al. [67] 3 7 3 7 7 3 3
Schottle et al. [68] 7 7 3 3 7 7 7 Chivikula et al. [69] 3 7 3 7 3 7 7
Madry et al. [70] 7 7 3 7 7 3 7 Springenberg et al. [71] 7 7 3 7 3 7 7
Athalye et al. [72] 3 7 3 7 7 3 7 Dong et al. [73] 3 7 3 7 3 7 7
Jeong et al. [74] 7 7 3 7 7 3 7
Table 9: Comparative analysis of Visual Recognition’s Attack Evaluation
3.3.6. Deep Learning
Biggio et al. [59] studied obfuscation (targeted) and poisoning (indiscrim-
inate) attacks against clustering ML algorithms focused on handwritten digit
recognition where the adversaries are thought to launch whitebox attacks the
clustering mechanism. The attack type is considered poisoning because the ad-
versaries can manipulate part of the data to be clustered. In addition to that,
the specific attacks cause clustering accuracy reduction by altering the cluster-
ing output on any data point. The same team also describes “practical” and
“optimal” evasion attacks.
Szegedy et al. [17] focused on the loss of performance of DNNs when ad-
versarial examples are included in the training sample (poisoning attack). Ac-
cording to their scenario, an adversary launches graybox attacks against the
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classifier (classification) by performing small perturbations to images with the
goal to make the system misclassify (increase both false positives and false neg-
atives) the images. The perturbations can be found by optimizing the input to
maximize the prediction error leading to an indiscriminate attack.
Goodfellow et al. [60] have shown that neural networks and deep neural
networks are vulnerable to adversarial perturbation of the training set (tar-
geted) because of their linear nature. Consequently, an adversary can launch a
whitebox poisoning attack against the training set after adding perturbations
to the input. This action will increase both false positives and false negatives
of the classification mechanism (classification), which in their case was applied
to image recognition. Finally, this is an indiscriminate attack as the adversary
affects the entire set of instances. The same researchers [61] have proposed a
new framework called “adversarial nets” for deep learning, which sidesteps the
difficulties of approximating many intractable probabilistic computations that
arise in maximum likelihood estimation and related strategies, and leverages
the benefits of piece-wise linear units in the generative context. This framework
corresponds to a minimax two-player game. The attacker creates a generative
training model aiming to maximize the probability that the classifier will not
detect his input (false negative). They have created an whitebox evasion attack
that does not affect the training process and imitates the entire normal data
distribution (indiscriminate) with an added noise.
Nguyen et al. [16] shed light to another scientific area of pattern recognition,
the use of DNNs for visual classification (classification). They proved that an ad-
versary launches blackbox to graybox attacks, by using evolutionary algorithms
and gradient ascent is able to fool a DNN (increase false negatives). Accord-
ing to the authors retraining a DNN using fake images and labelling them as
such makes no difference as the production of new sets of fake images (evasion
attack) will confuse the classifier again. By using evolutionary algorithms, the
adversary generates novel images launching an indiscriminate attack.
Papernot et al. [63] highlighted the importance of adversarial sample trans-
ferability in the context of image recognition using DNNs. According to their
attack scenario, the attackers launch blackbox attacks against the classifier (clas-
sification) and they use adversarial samples to mislead a model as well as models
that are influenced by this. They define this as adversarial sample transferabil-
ity. These attacks are launched towards a DNN and are often called black box
attacks. Their type is evasion because the adversary’s only capability is to ob-
serve labels assigned by the DNN and their goal is to increase the false negative
rate of the DNN so as to misclassify adversarial inputs, while remaining cor-
rectly classified by a human observer. Since the attacker solves an optimization
problem to produce a vector of adversarial instances, this is an indiscriminate
attack. The same main author and his team [64] provided a method to craft
adversarial samples using a substitute DNN. They assume that the attacker
can launch blackbox attacks against the classifier (classification). The attack
strategy includes building a substitute DNN approximating the oracle based on
synthetic queries made directly to the oracle and then using it to craft adver-
sarial samples that will later be used against the oracle (evasion attack). As
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the manifestation of the attack will cause the misclassification of the adversar-
ial samples the increase of false negatives remains as the final goal. Since the
attacker aims to produce a minimally altered version of any input this leads to
an indiscriminate attack.
Kurakin et al. [65] injected adversarial examples into the training set us-
ing the adversarial training methodology in both classification and clustering .
They also observed the transferability of adversarial examples between differ-
ent models and the importance of the “label leaking” property. Their examples
focused on ImageNet data set, varying in terms of attacker knowledge (black-
box - whitebox attacks), attack type (poisoning and evasion attack), as well
as performance impact (both false positives and false negatives and clustering
accuracy reduction. Their attack model is indiscriminate as it covers the entire
set of pixels of an image.
Hayes and Danezis[62] investigated universal adversarial networks in the con-
text of neural networks and image recognition. They studied generative networks
that are capable of fooling a target classifier (classification) when its generated
output is added to a clean sample from a dataset. In their attack models, the at-
tacker launches whitebox attacks against the classifier by accessing the training
data (poisoning attack). In addition, the attacker wants an adversarial sample
to be misclassified as something else, thus increasing false negatives rate. [58]
and [62] investigated both targeted and indiscriminate attack cases but from
the point of view of (i) having the attacker mapping any image to a chosen
class (targeted); and (ii) performing any misclassification in the target model
(indiscriminate).
Evtimov et al. [66] focused on real road sign recognition (classification) and
the use of DNNs by introducing a new attack method called Robust Physical
Perturbations. This generates perturbations by taking images under different
conditions into account. The adversary can launch whitebox evasion attacks
(checking the effects of his attacks) by using physical perturbations (targeted)
with upper goal the misclassification (increase both false positives and false neg-
atives). These perturbations are categorized in two types: subtle perturbations
that occupy the entire region of the sign (can be seen as indiscriminate); and
(2) camouflage perturbations that take the form of graffiti and abstract art (can
be seen as targeted).
Madry et al. [70] studied the robustness of deep learning algorithms against
such well-defined classes of adversaries. They claim that their work is an im-
portant step towards fully resistant deep learning models. More specifically,
they studied the robustness of neural networks against adversaries through op-
timization in the context of computer vision. They provided guarantees on the
level of security solving a maximin optimization problem and modelled both
attacks against classification and defences through a general theoretical frame-
work. Their theoretical and experimental results show that the locally maximum
values of the loss function of an adversary found by a Projected Gradient Descent
(PGD) are similar for normally and adversarially trained networks (poisoning
and evasion attacks). This means that robust networks against PGD adver-
saries are also robust against a wide range of attacks, increasing false positives,
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false negatives or both false positives and false negatives. Their experiments used
MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets for whitebox and blackbox attacks. Due to the
attacker solving the proposed inner maximazitation problem, the investigated
attack is categorized as indiscriminate.
Recently, Athalye et al. [72] investigated the prevalence of obfuscated gradi-
ents on neural networks in MNIST [56] and CIFAR10 [75] datasets. They inves-
tigated whitebox attacks against the classifier (classification) generating both
targeted and indiscriminate adversarial examples with iterative optimization-
based methods that require gradients obtained through backpropagation. Con-
sequently, many defenses either intentionally or unintentionally cause gradient
descent to fail (poisoning) by either minimizing, or maximizing the classifica-
tion loss increasing both false positives and false negatives. This happens due
to obfuscated gradients caused by gradient shattering, stochastic gradients, or
vanishing/exploding gradients.
In the context of deep neural networks, Dong et al. [73] proposed targeted
and indiscriminate blackbox attacks. They used a broad class of momentum it-
erative gradient-based methods that generate adversarial examples. These can
successfully fool robust classification models (evasion). In their experiments,
they used the ImageNet database [37]. Their goal was to boost adversarial at-
tacks, which can effectively fool whitebox as well as blackbox models increasing
false negatives.
Jeong et al. [74] focused on the impact of adversarial samples on multimedia
video surveillance using deep learning and blackbox settings. Using the MNIST
and NSL-KDD datasets, they injected, in an indiscriminate way, adversarial
samples into the training session of Autoencoder and Convolution Neural Net-
work (CNN) classification models. This was a poisoning attack aiming to lower




Uther et al. [76] were one of the first teams that focused on multi-agent rein-
forcement learning techniques. In specific, they created a framework, consisting
of a two-player hexagonal grid soccer in order to evaluate the algorithms pro-
posed in this scientific area. According to their assumption the attacker launches
graybox attacks against the classifier (classification) because he needs to collect
large amounts of data by observing (targeted) his opponent’s moves (evasion
attack). His final goal is to increase the false negatives of the attacked classifier
by solving a minimax mathematical problem (indiscriminate).
3.4.2. Collaborative Filtering
In the context of movie recommendation systems Guillory and Bilmes [77],
have studied a submodular set cover problem where a set of movies is suggested
to a user according to their feedback. The assumption is that the adversary
attempts a graybox poisoning attack against the the clustering mechanism by
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injecting a limited amount of adversarial noise (targeted) during query learn-
ing. This attack aims at causing clustering accuracy reduction, resulting in bad
recommendations if we take into consideration the user’s preferences.
3.4.3. Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs)
Papernot et al. [18] proposed an attack model for the misclassification of out-
puts of Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) by crafting adversarial sequences
both categorical and sequential during test time (evasion attack). According to
their perception the attacker launches indiscriminate graybox attacks (model’s
architecture, computational graph and values of parameters learned during
training) during test phase. In their experiments based on a movie review clas-
sifier (classification), the authors derived 100% misclassification of the training
data of categorical sequences (increase both false positives and false negatives),
when they alter 13% of the words in movie reviews. As the attacker solves an
optimization problem to determine the vector of adversarial instances, this is
characterized as an indiscriminate attack.
Attacker














































Uther et al. [76] 7 3 7 7 3 7 3 7
Guillory et al. [77] 7 3 7 3 7 7 7 3
Papernot et al. [18] 7 3 7 7 3 7 7 3
Alfeld et al. [78] 7 3 7 7 3 7 7 3
Zeager et al. [79] 7 7 3 7 3 7 3 7
Shokri et al. [80] 3 7 7 7 3 7 7 3
Biggio et al. [81] 7 7 3 7 3 7 7 3
Sharif et al. [82] 7 3 3 7 3 7 7 3










































Uther et al. [76] 7 3 7 3 7 3
Guillory et al. [77] 3 7 7 3 3 7
Papernot et al. [18] 7 3 7 3 7 3
Alfeld et al. [78] 7 3 3 7 3 7
Zeager et al. [79] 7 3 7 3 7 3
Shokri et al. [80] 7 3 7 3 7 3
Biggio et al. [81] 3 7 7 3 3 7
Sharif et al. [82] 3 3 7 3 7 3




























































Uther et al. [76] 3 7 7 7 3 7 7
Guillory et al. [77] 3 7 3 7 7 7 3
Papernot et al. [18] 3 7 3 7 7 3 7
Alfeld et al. [78] 7 7 3 7 7 3 7
Zeager et al. [79] 7 7 3 7 3 7 7
Shokri et al. [80] 7 7 3 3 7 7 7
Biggio et al. [81] 7 7 3 3 7 7 7
Sharif et al. [82] 3 7 3 7 7 3 7
Table 12: Comparative analysis of Other Applications’ Attack Evaluation
3.4.4. Autoregressive Forecasting Models
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Alfeld et al. [78] have presented a mathematical framework of an attack
method against autoregressive forecasting models (classification). In such mod-
els, an attacker aims to augment the initial values (poisoning and indiscrim-
inate) so that the forecast ones, computed by an auto-regressive forecasting
model, will be as close as possible to the goal of minimizing the difference of the
forecast and the desired value. The graybox attack aims to increase both false
positives and false negatives of the forecasting model.
3.4.5. Game Theory
Zeager et al. [79] have studied the problem of attacks in credit card fraud
detection systems that classify (classification) charges as fraudulent or not, and
they modeled it as a game. The attacker by launching whitebox attacks aims
at modifying the attributes of the transactions in order to make fraudulent
charges and get undetected (increase false negatives). The adversarial classifier
is retrained in multiple rounds of the game using a logistic regression model.
The attacker then chooses the subset of fraudulent transactions that utilize the
best strategy (evasion attack and indiscriminate specificity).
3.4.6. Deep Learning
Shokri et al. [80] shed light on a very important area of machine learning,
which focuses on how classification machine learning models leak information
about the individual data records on which they were trained. They demon-
strated an inference membership attack, where the adversary, launches black-
box queries to an ML model, aiming to verify whether some data records were
used to train the model (evasion attack). In more detail the attacker trains an
attack model to distinguish whether a sample was used in the training of the
target or not. In order to train the attack model, the adversary trains first a
number of shadow models which imitate the target’s behaviour (increase false
positives rate). Since the attacker generates a number of shadow models that
are distributed similarly to the target model’s training dataset, this is an indis-
criminate attack.
In the context of biometric face verification systems (classification), Biggio
et al. [81] proposed two face recognition attacks, where they demonstrated how
to poison (poisoning attack) biometric systems that learn from examples (both
targeted attacks). In these cases, the attacker aims to impersonate a targeted
client (increasing false positive rate), by launching whitebox attacks against
system.
Sharif et al. [82] demonstrated techniques against facial biometric systems.
More precisely they focused on inconspicuous and physically realizable attacks
that generate accessories in the form of glass frames to deceive the classifier
(classification). This technique was studied to both misclassify samples to any
other than the correct class, increasing both false positives and false negatives
and impersonate others using the eyeglass frames. The adversaries in their ex-
periments launch graybox or whitebox attacks against the classifier by observing
its outputs (evasion attack) for some inputs. They investigated two categories
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of attacks; impersonation and dodging. The former is indiscriminate, as the at-
tacker aims to have any face recognized as a specific other face, while the latter
is a targeted attack, since the attacker seeks to have her face misidentified as
any other arbitrary face.
3.5. Multipurpose
3.5.1. Naive Bayes - Principal Component Analysis
Huang et al. [10] were one of the first teams to shed light adversarial at-
tacks for machine learning. Besides proposing a taxonomy, they also presented
attacks in the context of spam detection and network anomaly detection. They
present the adversaries working against classification and clustering mechanisms
by launching blackbox to whitebox attacks. Their spam filtering attacks can be
either be evasion attacks that increase false negatives or poisoning attacks that
affect both false positives and false negatives depending on if they want to evade
the detector or cause denial of service. They can also be either targeted or
indiscriminate in terms of attack specificity. In the case of network anomaly
detection the attacks are mostlypoisoning as the adversary poisons the training
dataset to evade detection (increase false negatives).They are also indiscrim-
inate adversaries who cause many false negatives. The authors model secure
learning systems as a game between an attacker and a defender, in which the
attacker manipulates data to mis-train or evade a learning algorithm chosen by
the defender to thwart the attacker’s objective.
3.5.2. Support Vector Machine (SVM)
Biggio et al. [32] make use of the gradient ascent method, which is a crude
algorithmic procedure to perform a graybox poisoning attack against the Sup-
port Vector Machine (SVM) (classification) algorithm by finding a specific point
(targeted) whose addition to the training dataset maximally decreases the clas-
sification accuracy. The poisoning methodology involves specially crafted attack
points injected into the training data. The attack affects both false positives and
false negatives as it increases the classifier’s error rate.
Zhou et al. [83] studied two evasion (evasion attack) attack models in the
context of spam email detection systems and credit card fraud detection systems
(classification) where an adversary launches graybox to whitebox attacks, is
trying to avoid detection (increase false negatives): in the free-range attacks the
adversary is able to move the data anywhere in the feature space while on the
restrained attacks he sets bounds on the displacement of the features. The latter
attack model proved the existence of a trade-off between disguising malicious
and retaining their malicious utility. In the restrained attack, the adversary
alters one single instance (targeted) while in the free-range attack the adversary
aims to perturb the entire set of instances (indiscriminate).
Demontis et al. [84] focus on the vulnerability of linear classifiers (classifica-
tion) in the context of handwritten digit classification, spam filtering and pdf
malware detection. They investigated evasion attacks. According to their threat
model an adversary launches graybox to whitebox attacks by modifying specific
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malicious samples (targeted) during the test phase, having as goal to misclassify
them as benign (increase false negatives).
Zhang et al. [85] performed experiments on spam detection and PDF mal-
ware detection systems and proposed two algorithms for feature selection against
adversaries. Under adversarial settings, the use of reduced feature sets resulted
in improved computational complexity and in more robust classification against
graybox to whitebox evasion attacks that try to avoid detection (increase false
negatives). Both algorithms aim at maximizing the generalization capability of
the linear classifier (classification) and the robustness to evasion attacks, both
consisting the objective function of the optimization problem (indiscriminate).
3.5.3. Support Vector Machine (SVM) - Logistic Regression
The same author and his team [86] assumed that adversaries, launch white-
box attacks against a classifier in a variety of applications: spam email detection
(indiscriminate), biometric authentication (targeted) and network intrusion de-
tection (indiscriminate), can launch evasion attacks depending on an arms race
game and affecting the distribution of training and testing data separately. The
final goal of those attacks is to avoid detection of their activities (false negatives
rate) by the classifier (classification).
Mei et al. [87] presented an efficient solution for a broad class of poisoning
attacks against spam email detection systems and wine quality modelling sys-
tems. They managed to find an optimal training-set and attack a broad family
of machine learners by solving a bilevel optimization problem (indiscriminate).
In training-set attacks, an attacker contaminates the training data so that a
specific learning algorithm would produce a model profitable to the attacker.
Under natural assumptions (differentiable space and convex objective function)
they reduced the problem to a single level optimization. By using the Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, they derived three concrete cases of attacks
against classification (logistic regression, SVMs and linear regression) by only
being allowed to change the features (whitebox attacks) during the training
phase. Their assumption was that the adversary is trying to bypass classifier’s
detection (increase false negatives).
3.5.4. Support Vector Machine (SVM) - Multiple Classifier System (MCS)
In continuation of their work, the same team [88] created one and a half class
classifier (classification), in order to achieve a good trade-off between classifi-
cation accuracy and security. They experimented with real world data in spam
detection and PDF malware detection to test their assumption. According to
their attack model an attacker can launch graybox to whitebox evasion attacks
against the classifier by modifying malicious data at test time in order to have
malicious samples misclassified as legitimate (increasing false negatives). Au-
thors assume that the attacker manipulates an initial malicious sample, char-


































































































Huang et al. [10] 3 3 3 3 3 7 7 3 Biggio et al. [32] 7 3 7 7 3 7 7 3
Biggio et al. [86] 7 7 3 7 3 7 7 3 Biggio et al. [88] 7 3 3 7 3 7 7 3
Liu et al. [89] 7 3 7 7 3 7 3 7 Bulo et al. [90] 7 3 7 7 3 7 3 7
Gonzalez et al. [91] 7 3 3 7 3 7 7 3 Alpcan et al. [92] 7 7 3 7 3 7 3 7
Demontis et al. [84] 7 3 3 7 3 7 7 3 Gonzalez et al. [93] 7 3 3 7 3 7 7 3
Li et al. [94] 7 7 3 3 7 7 3 7 Louppe et al. [95] 7 3 3 3 7 7 7 3
Wang et al. [20] 3 7 3 7 3 7 7 3 Bhagoji et al. [96] 7 7 3 7 3 7 7 3
Cisse et al. [97] 7 3 7 7 3 7 7 3 Mei et al. [87] 7 7 3 7 3 7 7 3
Zhou et al. [83] 7 3 3 7 3 7 7 3 Zhang et al. [85] 7 3 3 7 3 7 7 3
Table 13: Comparative analysis of Multipurpose at Preparation Phase
3.5.5. Game Theory
Liu et al. in [89] in the context of handwritten digit recognition and spam de-
tection (classification) modeled the interaction of a data miner and an adversary
using a one-step game-theoretical model, where the adversary aims to minimize
both the difference between distributions of positive and negative classes and
the adversarial movement itself (increase false negatives). They provided a more
computationally efficient algorithm to find the NE of a binary classification by
solving one maximin optimization problem only (indiscriminate). The adver-
sary modifies the feature vectors ( graybox evasion attack) in order to shift
them during the test phase.
Bulo et al. [90] extended the work of Bruckner et al. [48] on static prediction
games by introducing randomization to the previous model, applied on a va-
riety of domains (spam email detection system, handwritten digit recognition,
PDF malware detection). Their experimental results on various applications but
mainly on handwritten recognition indicate that the classifiers (classification)
can be learned by the adversary (graybox attacks) when he deviates from his
hypothesized action by the learner. However in order for this to happen, the
adversary needs to apply several modifications to the malicious samples at test
time (evasion attack). In addition to that, the threat model includes attacks
in which malicious samples are manipulated at test time to evade detection in-
creasing false negatives. Similar to [48], the adversary performs indiscriminate
attacks.
Alpcan et al. [92] use game theory to provide adversarial machine learning
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strategies based on linear Support Vector Machines (SVMs), which leads to a
large-scale game formulation. In a variety of domains (communication networks,
smart electricity grids, and cyber-physical systems), a Support Vector Machine
(SVM) is considered as a binary classifier (classification). Their threat model
assumes whitebox distortions of any training data points (poisoning attack and
indiscriminate), which are attacks launched by an attacker who injects data to
increase false negatives aiming misclassification of his data.
3.5.6. Deep Learning
Munoz et al. [91] proposed a poisoning attack model in order to maximize
the misclassification (both false positives and false negatives) performance of
various learning algorithms. In contrast to previous works that studied poison-
ing attacks solely against binary learners, the authors are the first to study
this problem against multiclass classification (classification) settings extending
previously studied models. As in graybox to whitebox poisoning attacks, the
attacker controls a fraction of the training data and the attacker’s knowledge
varies. This paper investigates both targeted and indiscriminate attacks.
Gonzalez et al. [93], proposed a novel poisoning algorithm based on the idea
of back-gradient optimization, i.e., to compute the gradient of interest through
automatic differentiation, while also reversing the learning procedure to drasti-
cally reduce the attack complexity in classification. Their threat model includes
an adversary launches either targeted or indiscriminate graybox to whitebox
attacks with either poisoning orevasion attacks. The adversary’s final goal is to
increase either false negatives or both false positives and false negatives.
Wang et al. [20] proposed an adversary resistant model in order to con-
struct robut DNNs. Their methodology, Random Feature Nullification (RFN),
randomly nullifies features within the data vectors. Experiments were con-
ducted against malware and image recognition samples on MNIST and CIFAR-
10 datasets. The experiments includedwhitebox and blackbox poisoning attacks
during the training phase, aiming to make the classifier classify a benign appli-
cation as malicious (increase false positives). The experiments proved that the
classification accuracy (classification) decreases slightly in all the cases when
the nullification rate increases while on contrary the resistance increases signifi-
cantly. As the adversarial perturbation is generated by computing the derivative
of the DNN’s cost function with respect to the input samples, this is character-
ized as an indiscriminate attack.
Cisse et al. [97] used MNIST, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and Street View House
Numbers as datasets and they proposed an efficient algorithm for data augmen-
tation during training of DNNs that when combined with the use of Parseval
networks results in robustness of a system against adversarial noise. Parseval
networks are used as a multi-layer regularisation method to reduce the sensi-
tivity of DNNs against perturbed noisy samples. The authors performed exper-
iments where adversaries can poison training (graybox poisoning attack) of an
image classifier (classification) in order to avoid detection (increase false nega-
tives). The investigated adversarial model assumes that the attacker causes a
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small perturbation of the input pattern with the goal to remain stealthy; thus
we ascertain that this is a targeted attack.
3.5.7. Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN)
Li et al. [94] focused on Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) consid-
ering a variety of applications such as image translation, speech synthesis and
robot trajectory prediction. GANs are a part of clustering methodologies. The
authors proposed that an adversary who participates in a two player game, is
able to launch a whitebox poisoning attack, aiming to cause clustering accu-
racy reduction of the system by generating samples that are similar to the data
distribution (indiscriminate). Louppe and Cranmer [95] also working in GANs,
focused on computer simulations and on how they could use data generation to
help a variety of different scientific fields (e.g., particle physics, epidemiology,
and population genetics). They proposed a likelihood-free inference algorithm
for fitting a non-differentiable generative model incorporating ideas from em-
pirical Bayes and variational inference. Their novelty is that they use a domain
specific simulator instead of a differentiable generative network. Their percep-
tion of an adversary against
textcolorblackclustering is that he is able to launch graybox to whitebox poi-
soning attacks to inflict clustering accuracy reduction of the attacked system.
The proposed Adversarial variational optimization follows the indiscriminate
pattern of attacks.
3.5.8. Support Vector Machine (SVM) - Deep Learning
Bhagoji et al. [96] focused on image recognition and human activity recog-
nition to use linear transformation as data defence against evasion attacks.
According to their threat model the attacker has perfect knowledge of the clas-
sifier (classification) as he can launch whitebox attacks. Their threat models
covers two cases: Targeted and Untargeted whether the attackers aims at classi-
fying samples as part of a specific class or misclassifying all samples, respectively



















































































Huang et al. [10] 3 3 7 3 3 7 Biggio et al. [32] 3 7 7 3 3 7
Biggio et al. [86] 3 3 7 3 7 3 Biggio et al. [88] 3 7 7 3 7 3
Liu et al. [89] 7 3 7 3 7 3 Bulo et al. [90] 7 3 7 3 7 3
Gonzalez et al. [91] 3 3 7 3 3 7 Alpcan et al. [92] 7 3 7 3 3 7
Demontis et al. [84] 3 7 7 3 7 3 Gonzalez et al. [93] 3 7 7 3 7 3
Li et al. [94] 7 3 7 3 3 7 Louppe et al. [95] 7 3 7 3 3 7
Wang et al. [20] 7 3 7 3 3 7 Bhagoji et al. [96] 3 3 7 3 7 3
Cisse et al. [97] 3 7 3 7 3 7 Mei et al. [87] 7 3 7 3 3 7
Zhou et al. [83] 3 3 7 3 7 3 Zhang et al. [85] 7 3 7 3 7 3























































































































Huang et al. [10] 7 7 3 7 3 3 7 Biggio et al. [32] 7 7 3 7 7 3 7
Biggio et al. [86] 3 7 3 7 3 7 7 Biggio et al. [88] 7 7 3 7 3 7 7
Liu et al. [89] 3 3 3 7 3 7 7 Bulo et al. [90] 3 7 3 7 3 7 7
Gonzalez et al. [91] 7 7 3 7 7 3 7 Alpcan et al. [92] 3 7 3 7 3 7 7
Demontis et al. [84] 3 7 3 7 3 7 7 Gonzalez et al. [93] 3 7 3 7 3 3 7
Li et al. [94] 3 7 3 7 7 7 3 Louppe et al. [95] 3 7 7 7 7 7 3
Wang et al. [20] 7 7 3 3 7 7 7 Bhagoji et al. [96] 7 7 3 7 7 3 7
Cisse et al. [97] 3 7 3 7 3 7 7 Mei et al. [87] 7 7 3 7 3 7 7
Zhou et al. [83] 7 7 3 7 3 7 7 Zhang et al. [85] 7 7 3 7 3 7 7
Table 15: Comparative analysis of Multipurpose’s Attack Evaluation
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4. Discussion and Conclusions
4.1. Distribution of papers per taxonomy phase
Figures 4-5 present the volume of papers for the different features of each
taxonomy phase, while Figure 5 illustrates the volume of papers for the evalu-
ation approach and the performance impact after the manifestation phase. The
motivation behind this is to derive trends about the degree that each feature
type has been investigated. This may assist with decisions regarding future work
and the identification of less investigated feature types. It is worth mentioning
that these numbers (i.e., number of papers per feature) will not sum up to the
total number of papers (i.e., 66) because many papers are investigating more


















Figure 4: Volume of papers for each preparation phase feature.
In Fig. 4, we observe that 64% of the papers investigate the cases of whitebox
attacks. This is expected because it is intuitive for authors to first investigate
attacks that have knowledge of the system, training data and machine learn-
ing algorithms. These can be insider threats. To investigate different ways the
attacker targets machine learning system and to make their defense solutions,
when this is provided, authors in approximately 11% of the papers investigate
all three different levels of attacker knowledge. Around 56% of the papers inves-
tigate blackbox attacks, which assumes that one of the parameters (e.g., training
data) is not known.
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The above percentages in terms of papers that do not study exclusively at-
tackers who launch whitebox attacks, are supported by the findings of our survey
regarding the number of papers that investigate Evasion Attacks (manifestation
phase). This is 52% of all papers surveyed and on many occasions are studied
in conjunction with the Poisoning Attacks which alone appear in56% of all

















Figure 5: Volume of papers for each manifestation phase feature.
Regarding the remaining preparation phase features, attacks on classifica-
tion are studied in 88% of the papers, while for clustering , this drops to only
17%. Furthermore, a surprisingly high number of papers (26%) study adversarial
machine learning using Game Theory. Given the strategic interactions between
defender (machine learning system) and attacker, strategic choices provided by
game theory in the form of game equilibria appear as an attractive way to
optimize player’s strategies in various different types of games. It is worth men-
tioning that such approaches can be used to design optimal defences with the
assumption that the defender solves a zero-sum game thus preventing maximum
damages incurred by the adversary. Also, we observe that all papers that have
not proposed game-theoretic models account for 74% of all papers showing that
there aren’t papers that study both types of this feature.
With regards to the manifestation phase, apart from Attack Influence that
we have discussed earlier, 80% of the papers study Indiscriminate Attacks, where
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the adversary attacks a very general class of samples. The high percent can be
justified by the benefit of making an attack more likely to be successful due
to the wide range of “targets” (i.e., samples) aimed by the adversary. When
combining different statistics, we also observe that papers in which the attacker
has exclusively Zero Knowledge, the attack is always indiscriminate meaning
that for a targeted attack to take place some prior knowledge must have been
acquired. Almost half of all papers (47%) study Targeted Attacks.
It is also worth highlighting that the vast majority of papers (92%) assume
non-colluding attackers, while only 11% introduces the notion of collaboration
among adversaries to manifest the attack. Interestingly, only one ([46]) uses
game theory to model interactions between a learner and a collection of adver-
saries whose objectives are inferred from training data. This work paves the way
for future work in the field towards inferring game strategies to defend against
collaborative attackers.
With regards to the evaluation approach, 95% have conducted experiments
with some realistic datasets to assess the performance of their methodology. This
shows that they do not analyze adversarial machine learning in a purely the-
oretic way but conduct experiments to measure the required parameters (false
positives, false negatives, clustering accuracy detection). Approximately 38% of
the papers assess their proposed framework both analytically and experimen-
tally with only 3 papers to restrict their assessment using analytical methods. It
is worth noting that [89] is the only paper that undertakes simulations, and this
in addition to experimental and analytical evaluation. Finally, 41% of all papers
measure both False Positives and False Negatives (FNs) whilst 48% measure
FNs alone. Only 9% and 6% of the papers measure the Clustering Accuracy















Figure 6: Volume of papers for each feature after the manifestation phase, where FPs: False
Positives, FNS: False Negatives, CAR: Clustering Accuracy Reduction.
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With regards to the usage of deep learning in the application categories
(Figure 7) we have studied we cn identify that Visual Recognition has the most
frequent usage of deep learning (86% of the papers of its category) with Other
Applications ranking second (50% of the papers of this category) and Multi-
purpose ranking third (39% of the papers of this category). Deep learning did
not appear in Spam Filtering, while it made only one appearance in Intru-
sion Detection category. This makes perfect sense as deep learning applications
are mostly used in visual recognition systems and biometric recognition sys-
tems with the most popular being face recognition systems. Spam Filtering and
Intrusion Detection systems are build mostly on top of linear methodologies.
In total 45% of our pool of papers was occupied with papers containing deep
learning methodologies, which highlights the significance of this specific machine












Figure 7: Volume of Deep Learning papers for each application domain
4.2. Open problems
Machine learning defensive mechanisms are evolving as new attacks are in-
troduced in the scientific community and new application areas are involved.
Throughout the papers that we have surveyed and classified using our taxon-
omy, a number of open problems have drawn our attention as areas for future
research.
Creating immunity to perturbations. A defensive approach that is pop-
ular in the literature is to train a system using modified data, so as to increase
its robustness against perturbations of input. This is a countermeasure that is
useful as long as the adversary keeps using the same algorithm for the pertur-
bations. In Chen et al. [40] retraining the classifier with noise resulted in the
increase of average prediction confidence but not necessarily of the accuracy.
As soon as there is any change in the algorithm, the accuracy of any detection
system drops even in the physical world [66]. Hayes et al. [58] have created an
attack that can overcome a wide range of defenses, and in [62] they found out
that models trained in an adversarial manner are still vulnerable to Universal
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Adversarial Perturbations trained against the defended model. For this reason,
Papernot et al. [64] concluded that defending against finite perturbations is
a more promising avenue for future work than defending against infinitesimal
perturbations.
Multiple adversaries. Dalvi et al. [30] point out that the challenge is
substantially different when a machine learning system has to face multiple ad-
versaries instead of one. In the majority of the literature, only a small number
of papers have investigated models with multiple adversaries who may collabo-
rate towards a common goal. Consequently, colluding attacks within Adversarial
Machine Learning is a challenge that can be investigated further.
Randomized adversarial approaches. According to Barreno et al. [29],
randomization of the distribution of the training data can increase the adver-
sary’s work, but it will also increase the learner’s initial error rate before ran-
domization. Determining the right amount of randomization is still an open
problem. Also, the same author [35] raised the issue of reflecting the lack of a
mechanism that can measure the value of the leaked information from a learn-
ing system to an attacker, thus quantifying the risk associated with various side
channel attacks that exploit leaked information.
Digital forensics for adversarial machine learning. Almost all exist-
ing research on addressing adversarial machine learning is focused on preventing
and protecting systems against it. However, given its impact in physical space
[65] and potential in assisting crime, it is important to also consider how to
forensically analyze such attacks while adhering to the principles of digital evi-
dence. The breadth and depth of machine learning knowledge required to spot
adversarial behaviour may be a barrier to many digital forensic professionals.
Here, it is likely that experience from multimedia forensics can help consider-
ably, as attempted already in [68]. What can be extremely useful is that re-
searchers develop methodologies, ideally supported by new software toolkits,
allowing digital forensic professionals to spot and analyze signs of purposeful
adversarial behaviour where the failure of a machine learning process causes
damage or assists a crime.
5. Conclusions
The wide adoption of machine learning techniques in almost every aspect of
modern society has made it a very popular area of scientific research in terms of
both attack and defense mechanisms. We have proposed a comprehensive tax-
onomy of the characteristics of adversarial machine learning approaches using
existing well-cited terminology. Based on the latter, we systematically reviewed
the landscape of adversarial machine learning approaches, paying special atten-
tion to the application area. In addition to that, we pointed out existing open
problems that require the attention of the scientific community.
In the future we plan to address the limitations of the previous approaches
and especially the vulnerability of machine learning against perturbations cre-
ating a framework, that will digest each newly introduced attack pattern and
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adopt accordingly. Additionally, we envisage the creation of a unified infrastruc-
ture which will acquire information for attacks against machine learning through
different application probes, thus creating a strong knowledge base which will
help augment the defences against adversarial attempts.
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